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I. INTRODUCTION
The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (HCCCA), signed
by member states of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in June
2005, is an important step in harmonizing national conflicts of law rules that
sometime strain to manage the burgeoning traffic in transnational litigation
generated by global commerce. This development is particularly important for
Canada, a nation dependent on the benefits of international business and trade
and particularly so given the recent sui generis evolution of Canadian conflict
of laws rules against which the HCCCA may provide a welcome panacea.
Nevertheless, given the narrow focus and application of the HCCCA to
* H. Scott Fairley is a Partner at Theall Group LLP; A.B., 1974; LL.B., 1977 (Queen's
University); LL.M., 1979 (N.Y.U); S.J.D., 1987 (Harvard); Member of the Canadian Delegation to the Hague
Conference of Private International Law, Special Commission on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (1997-2005); Member of the Working Group on Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments, Uniform Law Conference of Canada (1998-2004).
** John Archibald is an Associate atTheall Group LLP; B.A., 1998 (McGill); LL.B., 2001 (UNB);
LL.M., 2002 (Harvard). This article is a revised reproduction of oral remarks presented at the International
Law Weekend 2005, held at the House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, from October
20 to 22, 2005.
1. Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005,
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.pdf&cid=98 (last visited Mar. 6,2006) [hereinafter, the
"HCCCA"]. A documentary history of the Choice of Court Convention Project is available on the Hague
Conference website. Hague Conference on Private International Law Home Page,
http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=text.display&tid=l (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
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"exclusive choice of court agreements concluded in civil or commercial
matters," essentially a designation by private contracting parties of the court(s)
of one Contracting State to the HCCCA,2 much of the status quo in the national
law of Contracting States will remain undisturbed. Whether the HCCCA
ultimately gains broad acceptance and when it will come into force are also
open questions that only an indeterminate amount of time will answer.
Our purpose here is to give a succinct account of the applicable status quo
in Canada with respect to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
and the likely impact of the HCCCA thereon, assuming the Convention does
come into force and Canada follows through in ratifying it. We also focus on
the Uniform Law Conference of Canada's Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act,3 a model law for possible subsequent adoption by all Canadian
jurisdictions, the development of which paralleled Canadian participation in the
Hague project and which was conceived as a domestic legislative response to
many of the same issues addressed by the HCCCA.
IH. THE STATUS Quo
Prior to the Supreme Court of Canada's seminal ruling in Morguard
Investments v. De Savoye,4 Canadian courts rigorously adhered to the English
common-law approach to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.
This approach allowed that, unless the Canadian defendant had voluntarily
attorned to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, or was otherwise deemed to be
found within that jurisdiction in certain circumstances,5 the foreign proceeding
2. Id. art. 3.
3. Uniform Law Conference of Canada (hereinafter ULCC) Home Page,
http:I/www.ulcc.ca/en/home/ (last visited Mar. 6,2006); see also Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Act, available at http://www.ulcc.ca/en/us/index.cfm?sec=1 &sub= 1 e5 (last visited Mar. 6,2006) [hereinafter
Uniform Act].
4. Morguard Investments, Ltd. v. DeSavoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077.
5. See Emanuel v. Symon, [ 190811 K.B. 302, 309 (Eng. C.A. ).
In actions in personam there are five cases in which the Courts of this country will
enforce a foreign judgment:
I) Where the defendant is a subject of the foreign country in which the judgment
has been obtained;
2) Where he was resident in the foreign country when the action began;
3) Where the defendant in the character of plaintiff has selected the forum in
which he is afterwards sued;
4) Where he has voluntarily appeared;
5) And where he has contracted to submit himself to the forum in which the
judgment was obtained.
Id.; see also Vaughan Black, Enforcement of Judgments and Judicial Jurisdiction in Canada,
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could be safely ignored. The foreign plaintiff would be required to sue on its
judgment, against which a full defense on the merits could then be waged at
home. New Brunswick's Foreign Judgments Act6 and Saskatchewan's Foreign
Judgments Act7 effectively codify the pre-Morguard rules, only recognizing a
foreign court's jurisdiction where the defendant is, at the time of the
commencement of the action, ordinarily resident in the foreign country, or
where the defendant voluntarily attorns, or has expressly or impliedly agreed
to submit, to the foreign jurisdiction.
Somewhat surprisingly in retrospect, given that Lord Justice Buckley's
decision in Emanuel v. Symon focused specifically on foreign judgments,
Canadian courts, before Morguard, applied the English approach co-equally to
the enforcement of rulings from one province to another within the federation.
Thus, in either case, recognition and enforcement required a new action and
potentially a new trial. Legislatures in all Canadian provinces, except Quebec,
attempted to address the enforcement issue as between sister provinces with
reciprocal enforcement of judgments legislation! Some provinces' reciprocal
enforcement legislation went further, listing a number of foreign jurisdictions
as "reciprocating states" where complementary legislation has been adopted in
cooperating foreign jurisdictions. For example, British Columbia enacted the
Court Order Enforcement Act (COEA), 9 which allows ajudgment creditor from
a reciprocating state-including a number of foreign countries-to apply to the
Supreme Court of British Columbia to have the judgment registered as a
judgment of that court.' Nevertheless, under the COEA, the out-of-province
9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 547. (1989) (commenting critically on the pre-Morguard approach of
Canadian courts).
6. New Brunswick Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.N.B. c. F-19 (1973).
7. Saskatchewan Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.S. c. F-18 (1978).
8. See Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.O. c. R-5 (1990); Reciprocal Enforcement
of Judgments Act, R.S.A. c. R-6 (2000); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.S. c. R-3.1(1996);
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, C.C.S.M. c. J20 (2005); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments
Act, R.S.Y. c. 189 (2002); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.W.T. c.R-1(1988) as duplicated
for Nunavut Act, S.C. c. 28 (1993); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.N.S. c. 388 (1989);
Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act, R.S.P.E.I. c. R-6 (1988); Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments
Act, R.S.N.L. c. R-4 (1990); Court Order Enforcement Act, R.S.B.C. c. 78 (1996) (hereinafter, the "COEA"];
but see also Civil Code of Quebec, C.C.Q. Art. 3155 (2005); Quebec treats all judgments originating from
outside the province, whether they originate from another province or another country, as foreign judgments,
and its judgments receive the same treatment in the other provinces.
9. See COEA, supra note 8.
10. Id. § 29. The reciprocating states are all provinces and territories of Canada except Quebec,
most of the states of Australia, certain Pacific islands, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Austrian
Republic, the United Kingdom (pursuant to Schedule 4 to the Act), and, in the U.S.A., the following States:
20061
ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 12:417
or foreign judgment, as the case may be, will not be registered if the defendant
was neither carrying on business nor ordinarily resident in the otherjurisdiction
and did not voluntarily appear or otherwise submit to the other jurisdiction.1'
Thus, the COEA does not address those cases in which a plaintiff has a
judgment from another Canadian province or foreign country that clearly had
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the dispute, but the defendant was not a
resident of that province or foreign country and did not attorn. Therefore, while
this reciprocating legislation streamlines the process of recognition and
enforcement, substantively it still fails to take plaintiffs much beyond the rigid,
conservative confines of Emanuel v. Symon. Indeed, the Supreme Court of
Canada rendered its groundbreaking decision in Morguard, a British Columbia
case, within the context of the substantive shortcomings of the COEA.
Morguard eschewed the traditional English formula in relation to the inter-
provincial context, importing the American constitutional concept of "full faith
and credit"'" as between co-ordinate jurisdictions within national boundaries,
and posited a new formula. The enforcing court would recognize and enforce
the judgment of the originating court, precluding any further defense on the
merits, provided: the adjudicating court had properly exercised jurisdiction
under its own rules; and the enforcing court could satisfy itself that there was
"a real and substantial connection" between the adjudicating jurisdiction and
determinative features of the lis or the defendant as a party.'3
Further, the Morguard court, in prophetic unanimous reasons in obiter
authored by Justice LaForest, suggested that the same approach might apply to
foreign judgments of comparably civilized jurisdictions. Justice LaForest
premised his reasons on the notion of "international comity" which he
described as:
the recognition [that] one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights
Washington, Alaska, California, Oregon, Colorado, and Idaho.
11. Id. § 29(6)(b).
12. U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
13. Morguard, supra note 4, at 1103-1109; for discussion, see H. Scott Fairley. Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments by Canadian Courts: A New Age of Uncertainty, 2 CAN. INT'L LAW. 1, 2 (1996)
[hereinafter, A New Age of Uncertainty]; Joost Blom, Reform of Private International :Law by Judges:
Canada as a Case Study, in REFORM AND DEvELOPMENT OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF SIR PETER NORTH 31-49 (James Fawcett ed., 2002).
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of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of
its laws.14
Justice LaForest resurrected this nineteenth-century notion, borrowed from
American jurisprudence, in light of late twentieth-century realities placed on a
trade-dependent country:
Accommodating the flow of wealth, skills and people across state
lines has now become imperative. Under the circumstances, our
approach to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
would appear ripe for reappraisal. Certainly, other countries, notably
the United States and members of the European Community, have
adopted more generous rules for the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments to the general advantage of litigants. 5
The LaForest opinion added that "[u]nder these circumstances, our
approach to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments would
appear ripe for a reappraisal." Lower courts across Canada enthusiastically
took up this invitation to a dramatically liberalized approach and their endorse-
ments entailed sometimes harsh consequences for Canadian defendants. t6 The
retrospective application of the new rule caught many defendants who had
decided, pre-Morguard, not to defend themselves against foreign law suits. 7
It also caught those defendants whose exposure to damages awards-notably
from U. S. civil juries-were far in excess of anything a Canadian court would
have awarded had the defendants been sued in a Canadian jurisdiction at first
instance.' 8 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court chose not to revisit such concerns
until Beals v. Saldanha,9 thirteen years later, in which it affirmed the
international comity branch of Morguard. With that, the lower court
applications of Morguard to transnational cases were essentially vindicated,
14. Morguard, supra note 4, at 1096.
15. Id. at 1098.
16. See Fairley, supra note 13, Blom, supra note 13.
17. See, e.g., Moses v. Shore Boat Builders Ltd. 106 D.L.R. (4th) 654 (B.C.C.A. 1993), leave to
appeal refused, 24 C.P.C. (3d) 294 (S.C.C. 1994), post-Morguard enforcement of pre-Morguard Alaska
Judgment; for other examples, see discussion in Blom, supra note _Ref129568697\h13, at 38-39; Fairley,
supra notel3, at 3-4.
18. See Joost Blom, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Morguard Goes Forth Into the World,
28 CAN. Bus L.J. 373 (1997); Fairley, supra note 13, at 3-5; H. Scott Fairley, In Search of a Level Playing
Field: The Hague Project on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES: CONFLICT AND COHERENCE 57 (Chi Carnody
et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter, In Search of a Level Playing Field].
19. Beals v. Saldanha, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416 [hereinafter, Beals].
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including those that yielded harsh results from the Canadian defendant's
perspective such as in Old North State Brewing Co.,20 considered in more detail
below.
The substantial connections test, as laid down in Morguard, forecloses any
re-opening of a case on its merits. In the wake of adopting this new test in the
enforcement of foreignjudgments, the question arises whether existing defenses
to enforcement, elaborated under the previous Anglo-Canadian common-law
approach of formal attornment, should be revised. The Supreme Court of
Canada, in Beals, answered this question-essentially, but not unequivocally-
in the negative. Once the Court satisfies itself that a substantial connection to
the foreign jurisdiction exists, defendants are left only with certain
impeachment defenses-namely, natural justice, public policy, and fraud-to
oppose recognition and enforcement of the foreign judgment.
The aforementioned defenses have-and, thus far, continue to retain-
relatively narrow application. For a defense based on natural justice, the
enforcing court measures the foreign judgment against its own standards of
natural justice, but does not impose requirements of conformity with its own
procedural rules. The public policy defense must establish that the foreign law,
on which the judgment is founded, is on its face, not in its application, offensive
to the fundamental morality of the Canadian legal system.2 Finally, a "fraud"
that was adjudicated upon in the foreign court cannot be re-litigated unless
newly discovered and material evidence has become available.2
Morguard, and later Beals, significantly altered the legal landscape for the
enforcement of foreignjudgments in Canada without any assurance of similarly
liberal treatment for Canadian judgments presented for enforcement in other
jurisdictions. The perceived result is a playing field tilted against Canadian
businesses, particularly those in the position of defendant.23
Though, as noted above, some provinces have designated several countries
as reciprocating jurisdictions in their reciprocal enforcement legislation, in
order to facilitate enforcement of judgments through a registration mechanism,
domestic rules alone do not guarantee reciprocal treatment by other countries,
as is the case under international treaties.24 Canada is a party to two treaties in
20. Old North State Brewing Co. v. Newlands Service Inc., 58 B.C.L.R. (3d) 144 (C.A. 1998),
affirming 47 B.C.L.R. (3d) 254 (S.C. 1997) (British Columbia enforcement of North Carolina default
judgment, see infra note 36 and accompanying text.)
21. Beals, supra note 19; see also Beals v. Saldanha, 54 O.R. 3d 641 (C.A. 2001).
22. J.G. CASTEL & J. WALKER, CANADIAN CONFLICrS OF LAW 14-25 (5th ed. 2002).
23. See H. Scott Fairley, Open Season: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in
Canada after Beals v. Saldauha, 11 ILSA J. INT'L COMP. L. 305 (2005).
24. This is the case of Germany and Austria notably in British Columbia as well as a number of
Australian States in a few provinces that so provide.
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the field of enforcement of judgments: the 1984 Convention between Canada
and the United Kingdom on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 25 and the 1996 Convention
between Canada and France on Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters and Mutual Legal Assistance in Maintenance.
2 6
As a simple "enforcement" convention, the Canada/United Kingdom
Convention does not deal with jurisdictional issues and is limited to facilitating
recognition and enforcement of judgments between the two countries.27 The
Canada/France Convention, signed in June 1996, is not in force because the
implementing legislation has not yet been adopted. One interesting feature of
the Canada/France Convention is that it provides a list of bases of jurisdiction
that can illustrate admissible grounds of jurisdiction.28
25. Convention Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Canada
Providing For the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Apr. 24, 1984, 1988 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 74. For the federal implementing legislation to this convention, see
Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, R.S.C., ch. C-30
(1985) (Can.) [hereinafter Canada/United Kingdom Convention].
26. The Enforcement and Judgments Conventions Act, Can-Fr. Rep., June 10, 1996, S.M. 2000,
c. 13. (Can.) [hereinafter Canada/France Convention].
27. Its application has remained fairly marginalized, most probably because it remains largely
ignored by practitioners. Only a handful of cases have relied expressly on the Canada/United Kingdom
Convention, such as in Fabrelle Wallcoverings & Textiles Ltd. v. North American Decorative Products Inc.,
6 C.P.C. (3d) 170 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1992), and J.B.S. Tooling Co. v. Upward Tool Group Inc., 6 C.P.C. (4th)
191 (Ont. Gen. Div. 1996). It was, however, ignored in Union of India v. Bumper Development Corp, 36
C.P.C. (3d) 249 (Alta. Q.B. 1995). The two Ontario cases have read the Canada/United Kingdom Convention
as incorporating the Morguard test.
28. Canada/France Convention, supra note 26, art. 5.
The court of the State of origin shall be deemed to have jurisdiction within the meaning of this Convention
if in particular:
The defendant had his or her habitual residence, if a natural person, or its principal
place of business, if an artificial person, in the State of origin when the proceedings
were started;
a) The defendant had a place of business or branch in the State of origin when the
proceedings were started and was served in that State in connection with a dispute
related to the activities of that place of business or branch;
b) In an action for damages in tort, quasi-delict or delict, the wrongful act occurred in
the State of origin;
c) The claim is related to a dispute in connection with rights in rem in immovable
property located in the State of origin;
d) The defendant expressly submitted in writing to the jurisdiction of the court of the
State of origin;
e) The defendant appeared without challenging the court's jurisdiction or presented a
defence on the merits;
f) The contractual obligation that is the subject of the dispute was or should have been
performed in the State of origin;
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II. LOOKING FORWARD
In the aftermath of Morguard, case law continues to develop in the
common-law provinces regarding the application of the decision's principles
and their extension to foreign judgments. Controversy and uncertainty remain
as those within and outside the legal profession appreciate that the Morguard
principle of comity amounting to full faith and credit might not always be
acceptable because of the variety of legal systems around the world.
A. The Uniform Law
There is growing recognition in Canada of an unequal playing field in
transnational litigation.29 With this perspective in mind, the ULCC set about
drafting the Uniform Act,30 under which it seeks to clarify the enforcement rules
applicable in common law provinces. The Uniform Act establishes a closed list
of acceptable bases of jurisdiction, particularly for default foreign judgments,
in order to limit the application of the "real and substantial connection" test
imposed by the Morguard ruling.3' It also enables the enforcing Canadian court
to exercise some discretion to verify the jurisdiction of the foreign court and,
hence, determine whether enforcement is appropriate, as well as to limit the
enforcement of excessive damages awards.32
The ULCC, in drafting the Uniform Act, gave deep consideration to the
Hague's discussions on a comprehensive, worldwide draft convention on
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in order to ensure that some
degree of congruity and complementarities will exist between legislation based
on the Uniform Act and any Hague treaty or other treaty initiatives that may
eventually emerge. What the Uniform Act does not do is purport to offer a
competitive statutory regime that would interfere with current or future treaty
h) For any question related to the validity or administration of a trust established in the
State of origin or to trust assets located in that State, the trustee, settlor or beneficiary
had his or herhabitual residence or its principal place of business in the State of
origin;
i) In matters of custody of and access to children, the child had his or her habitual
residence in the State of origin at the commencement of the proceedings on the
merits;
j) In matrimonial matters, both spouses had their last common habitual residence in the
State of origin.
Id.
29. See In Search of a Level Playing Field, supra note 18.
30. Uniform Act, supra note 3.
31. Id. § 8.
32. Id. § 6.
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initiatives on the same subject matter. To this end, the ULCC has expressly
stated that the Uniform Act should apply only to the enforcement of foreign
judgments rendered in countries with which Canada has not concluded a treaty
or convention on recognition and enforcement of judgments.33 The Uniform
Act is premised as general legislation that could be augmented by more
specialized regimes such as the HCCCA and, thus, legislation based on the
Uniform Act would not apply to the extent that a proceeding falls within the
ambit of the HCCCA in a Canadian jurisdiction that has enacted and brought
into force both regimes.
To date, Saskatchewan is the only province that has introduced
legislation34 to adopt the Uniform Act, which will replace the province's much
more restrictive Foreign Judgments Act.35 Whether other provinces will enact
similar legislation remains to be seen. Nevertheless, one expects that such
legislation would help avoid, or at least minimize, the sometimes harsh results
that can arise from unqualified applications of Morguard and Beals. How
would the disposition of cases be influenced in the result?
Consider a recent post-Morguard decision of the British Columbia courts,
Old North State Brewing Co. v. Newlands Service Inc.36 There, the vendor (V),
situated in British Columbia, and a purchaser (P), in North Carolina, where the
goods were to be delivered, had signed a typical international sales contract for
the delivery and commissioning of machinery. V sourced a substantial portion
of its business abroad, much of it in the United States, and prudently inserted
into its standard form contract language that it was to be governed by the laws
of British Columbia and that the parties thereto would attorn to the courts of
that jurisdiction. Dissatisfied with the machinery, P sued V for breach of
contract in its home jurisdiction, not in V's home jurisdiction as specified in the
contract. V did not attorn and P obtained a default judgment in North Carolina
and an award of treble damages, pursuant to the local legislation, plus punitive
damages and attorney's fees.
Predictably, P sought enforcement of the judgment in British Columbia,
where V's assets were available to satisfy it. P succeeded at first instance, and
the judgment was upheld on appeal. The enforcing court satisfied itself that "a
real and substantial connection" existed between the lis and the originating
court and, on the basis of Morguard, refused to permit a defense on the merits
33. See UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE OF CANADA, WORKING GROUP ON ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS, UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT (REVISED DRAFT & COMMENTARY),
Fredericton, New Brunswick: Aug.10-14, 2003.
34. An Act Respecting the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, Sask. Bill No. 101 of 2004-05
(Saskatchewan).
35. The Foreign Judgments Act, R.S.S., c. F-18 (1978).
36. Old North, supra note20.
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by V. Moreover, the trial court found that the parties' choice of forum clause
was non-exclusive. The British Columbia Court of Appeal agreed. It also
agreed that enforcement of both punitive and treble damages by way of a
default judgment in a foreign jurisdiction was not per se contrary to Canadian
public policy.
The application of the Uniform Act to a case like Old North would
possibly yield a much different and, at least from the perspective of the
Canadian defendant, more fair result. When measured against domesticjudicial
standards and litigants' expectations, the jurisdictional analyses of both the
British Columbia Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are consistent with
sections 8 and 9 the Uniform Act. The Uniform Act does not expressly prevent
a court from assuming jurisdiction based on a real and substantial connection
when faced with an exclusive choice of court agreement under which the parties
have agreed to be governed by a different jurisdiction. Nevertheless, section
10 of the Uniform Act is an "escape clause" that may have protected the
Canadian defendant in Old North. Section 10 provides that a foreign judgment
may not be enforced if the judgment debtor proves to the satisfaction of the
enforcing court that it was clearly inappropriate for the foreign court to take
jurisdiction. One may not be hard-pressed to argue that the North Carolina
Court inappropriately assumed jurisdiction by ignoring the choice of forum
provision in a typical international sales contract, and refusing to give effect to
the reasonable expectations of two sophisticated parties.
Further, Article 5 of the Uniform Act gives the enforcing Court the power
to reduce enforcement of non-compensatory and excessive compensatory
damages. It provides that, where the enforcing Court determines that a foreign
judgment includes an amount added to compensatory damages as punitive or
multiple damages or for other non-compensatory purposes, it will limit
enforcement of that part of the award to the amount of similar or comparable
damages that could have been awarded in the enforcing jurisdiction. Thus, in
Old North, the British Columbia court would have been encouraged and likely
would have exercised its discretion to eliminate the punitive and treble damages
award of the North Carolina court. Canadian defendants will doubtless
welcome such changes in judicial discretion influenced by the Uniform Act in
future enforcement actions. At the same time, the Uniform Act is also a
unilateral instrument that incoming litigants might view as undercutting the
principles of comity articulated in Morguard. Nevertheless, in the absence of
any alternatives on point, the Uniform Act appears necessary as general law in
aid of a better balanced status quo-a statutory guide to fine-tune a system
Canadian courts have not been prepared to fine-tune on their own.
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B. The HCCCA
Unlike the Uniform Act, which focuses only on recognition and
enforcement, but does so, on a broad front, the HCCCA regulates both the
jurisdiction to adjudicate and the recognition and enforcement of judgments,
but on a narrower front: disputes governed in business to business choice of
court agreements. Earlier convention drafts provided for jurisdiction on the
basis of several enumerated grounds, including a connection between the cause
of action and the court seized of the matter, which conforms with the Morguard
principle that the jurisdiction must have a "substantial connection" to the
action. While the HCCCA, like its earlier drafts, still treats the jurisdiction of
the rendering court as a linchpin, eschewing any general re-examination of
either the choice of law or adjudication on the merits, it establishes only a
single basis forjurisdiction, the parties' choice of forum, subject to safeguards
that may be applied by both originating and enforcing courts.
The HCCCA, as a multilateral convention, creates a level playing field for
Canadian parties to international litigation involving business-to-business
contractual disputes. It will limit-though perhaps not to the extent of its
earlier, wider-ranging drafts-the negative impact, real and perceived, of the
unilateral liberalization of domestic rules on enforcement of judgments in one
jurisdiction without reciprocal benefits accruing in others. International
initiatives have the principal benefit of avoiding the risks of unilateralism that
is counterproductive for important Canadian interests tied to international
commerce, a central concern prompting the Morguard obiter to embrace comity
between nations through their respective courts.37 Further, though the HCCCA
is considerably narrower in scope and effect than as originally envisaged,38 it
offers the possibility of both realistic success in its adoption by member states,
and a solid point of departure from which the Hague could very well expand
upon, working toward more comprehensive rules for jurisdictional
equilibration.
There are three basic rules on which the HCCCA's operation turns: first,
the court chosen by the parties in an exclusive choice of court agreement has
jurisdiction; second, if an exclusive choice of court agreement exists, a court
not chosen by the parties does not have jurisdiction, and shall decline to hear
the case; and, third, a judgment resulting from jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with a choice of court agreement (exclusive or non-exclusive) shall
be recognized and enforced in the courts of other Contracting States.
37. See A New Age of Uncertainty, supra note 13.
38. For a comprehensive discussion on the history of the Hague project and the difficulties
encountered therein see: Ronald Brand, Concepts, Consensus and the Status Quo: Getting to "Yes" on a
Hague Jurisdiction and Judgments Convention in TRILATERAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ISSUES: CONFLICT AND COHERENCE 71 (Chi Carmody et al. eds., 2003).
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Similar to the New York Convention,39 which has given a measure of
predictability to treatment of international arbitration agreements, the HCCCA
establishes rules for enforcing private-party agreements in respect of the forum
for resolution of any resulting disputes, as well as rules for recognizing and
enforcing the decisions issued by the chosen forum.4' Thus, with litigation and
arbitration on a more equal footing within an increasingly globalized legal and
economic order, parties to trans-national transactions are able select the form
of dispute resolution based on its individual merits rather than the parties' level




By rationalizing the forum selection process in international contract
litigation before national courts, the HCCCA aims to restore predictability-so
critical to international commercial transactions-that judicial discretion
exercised in such litigation can possibly undermine. Recall that, in Old North,
the North Carolina Court's discretion to consider optimal jurisdictional
placement of a dispute with international elements subverted the reasonable
expectations of the contracting parties; nevertheless, the British Columbia
Court subsequently recognized its jurisdiction and enforced the default
judgment. The HCCCA, which deals with both exclusive and non-exclusive
choice of court clauses, addresses this alarming version of comity.
Article 3 of the HCCCA creates a presumption that if a party lists only one
court or country, the clause is exclusive. This is important to enforcement of the
agreement, because only exclusive "choice of court" clauses are entitled to
enforcement under Article 5. Under Article 8, however, judgments of courts,
which took jurisdiction on the basis of any valid choice of court agreement that
is "exclusive" within the meaning of the HCCCA,42 are entitled to recognition
and enforcement.
In Old North, as noted above, the trial judge held that the contractual
provision committing the parties to attorn to British Columbia was not an
exclusive choice of forum clause. Rather, the trial judge held, and the Court of
Appeal affirmed, that the provision granted concurrent jurisdiction to British
39. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
40. Ronald Brand, A Global Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 10 ILSA J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 345 at 346 (2004).
41. Id. at 351.
42. See HCCCA, supra note 1, art. 22 (addressing reciprocal declarations on non-exclusive choice
of court agreements) ("A Contracting State may declare that its courts will recognize and enforce judgments
given by courts of other Contracting States designated in a choice of court agreement concluded by two or
more parties that meets the requirements of article 3, paragraph c), and designates, for the purpose of deciding
disputes which have arisen or may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, a court or courts
of one or more Contracting States (a non-exclusive choice of court agreement.")).
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Columbia courts with any other court in which the matter was properly brought.
The contractual language interpreted by the British Columbia courts as non-
exclusive would have been deemed exclusive pursuant to Article 3 of the
HCCCA43 and thereby would have qualified for recognition and enforcement
under Article 8. Thus, the North Carolina Court would not have had
jurisdiction to grant default judgment against the Canadian defendant. British
Columbia would have had exclusive jurisdiction as the only jurisdiction listed
in the contracting parties' choice of forum clause. Further, pursuant to Article
11 of the HCCCA, the British Columbia court would have had the discretion to
refuse recognition and enforcement of the North Carolinajudgment on the basis
that the punitive and treble damages awarded by the Court over-compensated
the plaintiff for actual loss or harm suffered. Article 11 provides:
Recognition or enforcement of a judgment may be refused if, and to
the extent that, the judgment awards damages, including exemplary
or punitive damages, that do not compensate a party for actual loss or
harm suffered. The court addressed shall take into account whether
and to what extent the damages awarded by the court of origin serve
to cover costs and expenses relating to the proceedings."
Interestingly, the HCCCA has a narrower damages provision than the
Uniform Act, which specifically allows the enforcing court to reduce a
compensatory damages award. Until quite late in the drafting process, versions
of the HCCCA provided for the reduction of compensatory damage awards 45;
43. Id. art. 3(b) ("A choice of court agreement which designates the courts of one Contracting State
or one or more specific courts of one Contracting State shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the parties have
expressly provided otherwise.").
44. HCCCA, supra note 1, art. 11 (emphasis added).
45. See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, DRAFT REPORT OF PRELIMINARY
DRAFT CONVENTION ON ExCLUsIvE CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS (Prel. Doc. No. 25), art. 10(2), Mar.
2004, available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/dgm-pd25e.pdf (last visited Mar. 6,2006), which reads
as follows:
Where the debtor, after proceedings in which the creditor has the opportunity to be heard, satisfies
the court addressed that in the circumstances, including those existing in the State of origin,
grossly excessive damages have been awarded, recognition and enforcement may be limited to a
lesser amount.
In no event shall the court addressed recognize or enforce the judgment in an amount less
than that which could have been awarded in the requested State in the same circumstances,
including those existing in the State of origin.
Similarly, subsection 6(2) of the Uniform Act, supra note 3, which was based on these earlier
drafts, reads as follows:
Where the enforcing court, on application by the judgment debtor, determines that a foreign
judgment includes an amount of compensatory damages that is excessive in the circumstances,
it may limit enforcement of the award, but the amount awarded may not be less than that which
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however, those provisions were removed on the basis that, where parties had
validly agreed on a certain court, there was no reason to interfere with the
compensatory component of that court's decision.46
Though the HCCCA will go a long way in ensuring predictability and
upholding the reasonable expectations of sophisticated parties to international
business contracts, Article 21 may stand in the way of the Convention's
ultimate effectiveness. Article 21 was originally proposed by the Canadian
delegation-then draft Article 20-to minimize the domestic impact of
asbestos-related litigation in the United States: "Upon ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession, a State may declare that it will not apply the provisions
of the Convention to exclusive choice of court agreements in asbestos-related
matters. 47
Other delegations subsequently proposed that the provision refer to
additional specific subject matters such as natural resources and joint ventures.
After continued discussion and drafting, the delegations agreed on a new
provision, which became Article 21 of the HCCCA, as enacted, giving Con-
tracting States a much broader, and seemingly unlimited, power to effectively
contract out of the HCCCA.a8
The only counterweight to the potential sweep of Article 21 declarations-
but it may be a substantial one-is the reciprocity language within it. This
language short-circuits the HCCCA for enforcement purposes in other
Contracting States, with respect to the reserved subject matter, where the
the enforcing court could have awarded in the circumstances.
Id.
46. See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE
INFORMAL WORKING GROUP ON THE JUDGMENTS PROJECT, IN PARTICULAR ON THE PRELIMINARY TEXT
ACHIEVED AT ITS THIRD MEETING: 25-28 MARCH 2003 (Prel. Doc. No. 22), at 33, June 2003, available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmpd22e.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
47. HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, PROPOSAL BY DRAFTING COMMrITEE,
DRAFT ON EXCLUSIVE CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS (Work. Doc. No. 110E), art. 20, April 2004,
available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/jdgmwd l0_e.pdf (last visited Mar. 6, 2006).
48. HCCCA, supra note 1, art. 21.
Declarations with respect to specific matters:
1) Where a State has a strong interest in not applying this Convention to a specific
matter, that State may declare that it will not apply the Convention to that
matter. The State making such a declaration shall ensure that the declaration
is no broader than necessary and that the specific matter excluded is clearly and
precisely defined.
2) With regard to that matter, the Convention shall not apply;
a) in the Contracting State that made the declaration;
b) in other Contracting States, where an exclusive choice of court
agreement designates the courts, or one or more specific courts, of the
State that made the declaration.
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exclusive choice of court agreement designates the courts of the State that made
the reservation at first instance. So the potential chilling effect goes both ways,
ensuring that States reap the consequences of what they sow.
IV. CONCLUSION
Writing on a similar topic for this publication in 2004, one of the present
authors observed: "At this time, Canada taken as a whole and specifically in
individual provinces, is one of the most hospitable jurisdictions in the world for
the recognition and enforcement of judgments from foreign jurisdiction. 49
Adoption of the HCCCA throughout Canada would neither fundamentally alter
nor undermine that appraisal. What the HCCCA would accomplish, however,
is amelioration of some of the harsher effects of the current Canadian common-
law regime and its treatment of Canadian defendants in relation to incoming
foreign judgments, at least those arising from exclusive choice of court
agreements. To the extent that the HCCCA becomes an understood and
appreciated tool by international commercial lawyers, ensuring that it will apply
may become a new drafting point for corporate counsel-but that is a subject
for another forum.
In the absence of the HCCCA taking hold, the Uniform Act may fulfill a
similar role as general law not confined to exclusive choice of court
agreements. It remains, however, that a unilateral statutory substitute for a
multilateral treaty instrument obviously lacks the same spirit of comity as a new
international treaty on point. The premise of the Uniform Act to give ground
in the field(s) occupied by any subsequent treaty instrument(s) appears to
vindicate this view. While the HCCCA is much more limited in scope and
coverage than originally envisaged, and may be disappointing to many of the
state actors who invested close to a decade of time and considerable effort in
the Special Commission's project, it is nevertheless an achievement that should
be welcomed and embraced by member states of the Hague Conference.
In general terms transcending the particular elements singled out for
discussion above, the HCCCA is a good start. From the Canadian point of view
presented here, that we hasten to add is ours and not necessarily that of any
Canadian government, there is also every good reason for Canada to welcome
the HCCCA and no compelling reason we can think of why Canada should not
do so.
49. Fairley, supra note 23, at 316.
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